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ABSTRAC T 
niis paper studies the incentives for information sharing among 
firms in a Cournot oligopoly facing a linear uncertain demand and an 
affine conditional expectation information structure. No information 
sharing is found to be the unique equilibrium in two cases in which the 
signals with equal precision are assumed indivisible and infinitely 
divisible. However, the nonpooling equilibrium converges to the 
situation where the pooling strategies are adopted as the amount of 
information increases. Hence, the efficiency is achieved in the 
competitive equilibrium as the number of the firm become large. 
COURNOT OLIGOPOLY WITH INFORMATION SHARING 
Lode Li 
1 ,  INTRODUCTION 
This paper studies the incentives for information sharing 
among firms in an oligopolistic industry in which there is some 
uncertainty in the demand function. We characterize equilibrium 
behavior in a model where firms may observe private signals about the 
true state of the demand, each firm first chooses a level of 
information that it commits to share with others and then chooses a 
level of production based on the information both from private sources 
and the "common pool." 
The model is a two-stage game. In the first stage, firms 
select levels of information to release which can be non-, partial, or 
full. Then private signals are generated and an "outside agency" 
conducts the transmission of the private information according to the 
firms' commitments. In the second stage, each firm observes its 
private signal, the levels of information-sharing selected by other 
firms and the publicized signals, The firms then determine their 
output level based on the information available. The equilibrium 
notion we use is that of a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. We 
proceed by solving the second stage first and the first stage is then 
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solved by assuming that payoffs from the first stage are determined by 
the equilibrium behavior in the second-stage subgame. We derive pure 
strategy Nash equilibria that are symmetric and subgame perfect under 
a symmetric information structure where firms receive private signals 
with equal precision. No information sharing is found to be the 
unique dominant equilibrium. However the ex post behavior of the 
nonpooling equilibrium converges almost surely to that of the 
information pooling situation when the total amount of information in 
the industry becomes large. Consequently the competitive limit will 
be reached when the number of firms increases. 
Several recent papers (Clarke [1 982 ), Gal-Or [1 984), Novshek 
and Sonnenschein [1 982 ), etc.) have addressed the same issue we 
discuss here. Two generalizations are made in this paper. First, in 
contrast to Clarke and Gal-Or where the signals are assumed to be 
normally distributed, our assumption, that the expectation of the true 
state conditional on the signals is linear in the signals, is general 
to include many interesting distributions which are especially 
appropriate here because they may obey the nonnegativity constraints 
of the inverse demand. Secondly, the results in this paper are derived 
for Cournot oligopoly with n firms and then the assymptotic properties 
of the equilibrium can be studied. The result, that no information-
sharing is the unique equilibrium even when the signals are 
correlated, is consistent with the result of a duopoly in Clarke and 
Gal-Or. Our limiting result, that firms are indifferent between no 
pooling and pooling when the total amount of information is large, 
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coincides with that of Novshek and Sonnenschein because their model is 
an approximation of ours when the signals are sufficiently accurate. 
The next section lays out the general model, In section 3, a 
unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium is derived for the second-stage game. 
The characterization of the information-sharing game and the 
asymptotic properties of the equilibrium are presented in section 4 .  
2 .  THE MODEL 
Consider an oligopoly with n firms producing a product at no 
cost. The inverse demand is given by 
p a + 9 - bQ, 
where a, b > O, and 9 is the true state of the world which is 
(2 .1 )  
generated according to a distribution g(e) with zero mean. Before 
deciding its output quantity, each firm observes a signal for 9. The 
signal observed by firm i is yi' Then yi is generated according to 
h(yi l e> .  Both these distributions are assumed to have finite 
variance. We define 
( 2 .2 )  
as the measure of the amount of data firm i is t o  receive, which is 
the expected conditional precision of yi. And let R = v:ro be the 
precision of the prior. The distributions g, h and ti are common 
knowledge. 
Before learning their signals, firms are required to commit 
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themselves to release a fixed amount of information to a common pool 
to be made "available" to all firms by an "outside agency." Assume 
signal yi can be divided linearly into two parts: the amount of
A A 
information revealed, yi, and the amount concealed, Yi' And yi has 
the expected conditional precision �i ( i ti) where 
1 
A 
ECVar(yi lolJ 
(2,3) 
One may view yi as the sample of the observations generated by the
,.. 
true state of the world and yi is the sample of a subset. Also note 
that ti and �i are directly proportional to the sample sizes. 
Therefore �i is a measure of the amount of information revealed by 
firm i; namely, if �i = O, there is no information sharing; if
�i = ti' there is complete information sharing; and if O < �i < ti ' 
there is partial information sharing. The value of �i is chosen prior 
to and independent of the actual realization of Yi' 
The "agency" reports to each firm the messages (�i'''' ' �n) and 
A A 
(yi''''' yn) after they are selected. Therefore the information that 
firm i can use for an output decision consists of its private signal 
A -
Yi or (yi,yi) and 
A 
(yi,yj , j # i) by 
A 
the reported information (yj , j # i), Denote 
xi. 
The further assumptions on the information structure are as 
follows: 
Assumption 1. 
Hence, the firms' private signals and transmitted signals are all 
unbiased estimators of 9, 
Assumption l· 
That is, each firm's expectation of the uncertainty is affined in the 
available signals. 
Assumption l· 
A -
yi,yi, i=1,2, • • •  n are independent, conditional on o. 
As pointed out by Li, McKelvey and Page [1985], the above assumptions 
are general enough to include a variety of interesting prior-posterior 
distribution pairs for different modeling purposes. For example, the 
Gamma-Poisson and the Beta-Binomial are reasonable here since we wish 
to impose the nonnegativity constraints on the intercept of the demand 
function. 
Suppose random variables 9 and Z = (zi,z2, • • •  ,zn) have the 
following properties: E[ziloJ = 9, for all i; EfOIZJ = c0 + c ' Z, 
c = <c1,c2, • • • ,cn); and zi are independent conditional on 9, Then
for all i, j # i,
s 
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(ii) z = �l di zi is unbiased and is sufficient in the estimation of 
prior mean, 
Proof: By conditional independence, 
But 
Hence, 
is linear in zi. Using a result from Ericson [1 96 8), we have 
Pi R ECelziJ = -- z + -- E[eJ. pi + R i pi + R 
(2 .4) 
(2 .5) 
(2 .6 ) 
( 2 .7 )  
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It follows, from equations (2 , 6 ) and ( 2 . 7 ) , that 
( 2 ,8) 
Then, 
RECQJ i > 0, and c0 = n 
R + �
i"j 
(2 .9) 
Q,E.D. 
In view of the above proof, the assumption that zi are 
conditionally independent may be replaced by E[zj lzi] are linear in zi 
for j Ii. By carefully defining the correlation between zi and zj ' 
the results in the paper will still be valid. 
Applying Lemma 1 ,  we can obtain the following results. First, 
(2.1 0) 
Secondly, define 
(2.1 1 )  
8 
where 
(2.12) 
It then follows that xi is unbiased and 
ECOIXiJ -
Qi - R x - Qi i
' (2.13) 
Finally, 
(2.14) 
3. MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we fix c�1.�2 ••••• �n> and derive the Bayesian 
• • 
equilibrium strategy functions qi= qi(Xi) for the second-stage 
subgame. The market equilibrium is found to be unique. The following 
lemma is crucial in the proof of the uniqueness of the equilibrium and 
we proceed with it first. 
Lemma i. Suppose the vectors of random variables Xi satisfy the 
following equations 
for all 1. 
Then, 
(3.1) 
9 
a.a. for all 1. (3.2) 
Proof. Taking the expectations of both sides of (3.1) conditional on 
gi (Xi), we have
z = i (3.3) 
where Zi = gi(Xi). Multiplying (3.3) by Zi' taking the expectations
and then summing both sides of (3.3) over all i, we get 
(3.4) 
Note that a 11 2. O for all i and � � aij 2. o since (aij ) is semi­
positively definite, So (3.4) implies E [(gi(Xi)>2] = o, for all i. 
That is, gi(Xi) = O almost surely for all i. 
Q,E.D. 
Proposition 1. For any fixed c�1 ••••• �n>• there is a unique Bayesian 
equilibrium to the second-stage game. The equilibrium strategy for 
each firm is linear (affine) in its information from the private 
source as well as the "common pool," 
Proof: The expected profit for firm i given its information Xi is 
The first order conditions yield 
2q
• 
= .!! + !(� y + f � � l - f
i
E[qj
•
l xi]. i b b ai i J1;i ai j J1 
Define the candidate linear strategies as 
and subtract 2qi fran both sides of equation (3,6), We have 
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(3.6) 
(3.7) 
(3,8) 
The third equation in (3,8) can be verified as follows by using the 
results (2.10)-(2.13). Note that 
= Aj + ) Aj � + Aj E [�t �j + �t Yj lxi] o � k k n+1 J J I 
jl 4 j 't'k ,. + ....i. A ) -y tj n+1 k'Fi ai k
' 
It then follows, 
11 
(3,9) 
(3.10) 
And the second equation in (3,8) holds if A�, i=1,,,,,n, j=0,1,,,,,n+1
satisfy the following n(n + 2) linear equations: 
1 =1, • • •  ,n, (3.11) 
12 
�
b - 2A
i
j = 
�
t A
j 
l + ) A
k
j + 
� ) 
ll
t
k Ak l' i, j =l,. • •  , n, !i'j .  (3.12) 0i j n+ k'Fi 0i k'Fi k n+ 
i=l, • • •  , n, and (3,13) 
1=1, • • •  , n. (3,14) 
It is tedious but, fortunately, not very difficult to solve this 
system of equations. Obviously A� and A!+l can be solved 
independently in the systems of equations (3,11) and (3.14) 
respectively. Equation (3,14) can help to reduce (3.13) to be n 
equations for Af and then A� follows directly. The solution is given 
as follows (see Appendix A for details): 
where 
Ai = a O (n + l)b ' 
i 
�i((n + 1)6i - �26k) 
Ai = b(n + 1) (1 + �flk&k) 
' 
j "' i, 
(3.15) 
(3.16) 
(3.17) 
( 3 .18) 
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( 3 .19) 
Now writing 
( 3 .20) 
• 
it follows from (3.8) that each i's Bayesian strategy qi must satisfy
for any xi. (3,21) 
By Lemma 2, gi(Xi) = O almost surely, and hence 
a.a., i=l, • • • •  n. (3.22) 
Q.E.D. 
The expected profit of firm i in this subgame can be easily expressed 
as a function of its strategy choice, that is 
(3.23) 
4. INFORMATION SHARING 
The payoff function that starts at the first stage can be 
derived by using equation (3.23), Denote the payoff for i by 
But 
(4.1) 
where 
2 
_ __..__ _ + D 
(n + 1)2b2 (n + 1)2b2R i 
Bi 1 
2((n + 1)6i - �6k)
1 + �flk6k , and 
The second equation in (4.2) follows from (2,14) and is shown as 
follows: 
where Bi and Bi are defined as above. By (2.14), we have 
Then 
14 
(4.2) 
( 4.3) 
( 4.4) 
(4.5) 
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2 a + 1 D ( ) 2 2 i �i'''''�n ' (4.6) (n + 1) b (n + 1) bR 
In fact, these explicitly calculated payof f functions enable 
us to investigate the equilibria of the games with asymmetric 
information, i.e. ti f tj for some i,j, But for the purpose of 
simplicity and illustration, we assume ti = t for all i in the rest of 
the paper. 
Proposition .2_, Complete information sharing is dominated by no 
information sharing when the information is symmetric. 
Proof, Calculate 
1 (<n + 1>2tCt + R) __..nL_J 
(n+1)2bR ((n + l)t + 2R)2 
- nt + R 
Cn - U2tCt + R) > O 
(n + 1)2b(nt + R)((n + l)t + 2R)2 
for n .L 2. ( 4. 7 )  
Q,E,D. 
Note that Ai diminishes as n or t goes to infinity, That 
means the net gains of no pooling and full pooling become close when 
the total amount of information is large in the industry or the 
signals the firms receive are sufficiently accurate. The first result 
follows from the fact that the price in the oligopoly with privately 
1 6  
held information converges almost surely to the price in the pooled 
information situation as long as the information is not costly (see 
Li, McKelvey and Page (1 985]; Palfrey (1 985]), Whereas the second 
result is consistant with Novshek and Sonnenschein's finding for a 
duopoly case since their model is a good approximation only when t is 
sufficiently large. 
Until now, we have not specified the constraints on the 
strategy space of the game. The question depends on the structure of 
the information. A natural choice for the strategy space is 
[0,t] c R + if the signal is infinitely divisible. But this is not 
true in many other situations. For instance, the precision �i might 
be a function of the signal only through the number of observations. 
So we have to consider two cases: the discrete and the continuous 
strategy spaces. In the discrete case we only investigate an extreme 
case, i. e. where a firm chooses to either not reveal any of its 
private information, or chooses to reveal all of it. And then the 
symmetric equilibrium for the continuous game is examined. 
Proposition 1. Suppose �i a {O,t), i=l, • • •  ,n. Then for n 2 2 and t > 
0, �1 = �2 = • • • = �n = O is the unique Nash equilibrium. 
Proof. Since the game is symmetric, we assume, without loss of 
generality, that �i = t, i=l, ••• ,k - 1 and �i = O, i=k + 1 ,  • • •  ,n, and 
denote the payoff of player k if �k = 0 by n k ( 0) and the payoff if
�k = t by Ilk(t). It is sufficient to show Ilk(O) - flk(t) > O for 
k=l, • • •  ,n because that means any player will be worse off by revealing 
1 7  
its signal in any case, and hence no pooling i s  the unique 
equilibrium. 
Clearly, it is equivalent to show Dk(O) - Dk(t) > O for all k. 
By (4.3)-(4. 5), 
+ (k - l)Rt[B�(O) - �(t)] [B�(O) + B�(t)] 
(k - l)t + 2R 
[(k - l)t + R][(n + k)t + 2 R] ' 
n + 1 
(n + k)t + 2R ' and
k Cn + k + l)t + 2R Bl(t) = (kt+ R)[(n + k + l)t + 2R) • 
Direct calculation shows that 
G(k) s (k - l)tB�(O) + tB�(O) - ktB�(t) 
( 4. 8) 
( 4. 9) 
(4. 1 0) 
(4.1 1 )  
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= -R[B�(O) - a;'<t)] 
Rt
[
n(k - 1)(n + k + 1)t2 + [(n - 1)(n + 3k - 1) + 2(k - 1)JtR + 2(n - 1)R2
] 
[(k - 1)t + R](kt + R)[(n + k)t + 2R][(n + k + 1)t + 2R] 
> O, and 
Rt[B�(O) - B�(t)] [(k - 1)t + RJG(k) > 0,
Therefore, 
for k=1,2, ••• ,n and n i 2. 
for n }. 2.
(4.12) 
(4.13) 
(4.14) 
Q. E.D, 
Proposition f, Suppose Ti a [O,t], i=1, ••• ,n. For any given n l 2 
and t > O, T1 = T2 = ••• = Tn = O is the unique symmetric equilibrium.
Proof: Note that Ti = O for all i is the symmetric equilibrium, then
ani1 
-a-1 
_ _0 .( O for all i and Ti = T, O < T { t is the symmetricTi T1�2-' .,-
equilibria, then 
ill.
I }. O for all i. Using the fact that aTilT1�2=• '.� 
(4.15) 
where 
Bil 
_ 2 
1IT - 2a + (n - 1)p 
Bil _ n + 1 2IT - 2a + (n - 1)p 
aBi 
I 
_! I 2(n - 1)(0 + nB) 
hi 
I (2a - p)(2a + (n - 1)p) ' and 
IT 
I Cn + 1)(n - 1)8 
I
T 
= (2a - p)(2a + (n - 1)p) ' 
a = t + (n - 1)T + R, p = t - T1 
we can calculate 
anil - 1 [- (n-1)(n + 3)� aTi h - (n + 02bR (2a + (n - 1)p) 
_ 28(n - 1)(n + 1)(4q + Cn - �>P>RJ 
(2a - p)(2a + (n - 1)p) 
n - 1 [ + 
(n + 1)2b ((n + 1)t + (n - 1)T + 2R)2 
2(t - :c><n + 1)((n + 3)t + 3(n - 1h + 4R) ] + (t + (2n - 1)T + 2R)((n + 1)t + (n - 1)T + 2R)3 
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(4.16) 
(4.17) 
( 4.18) 
(4,19) 
( 4.20) 
(4.21) 
2 0  
< 0 for n l 2 ,  0 < t, R < m, (4.2 2 )  
Therefore, �i = �. 0 < � .{ t ,  tor all i are not equilibria. We then 
anil 
verify that ,, I _0 j-'- i < O for n l 2 and O ! �i i t (see Appendix " �i 1 �r · ,. 
B), and conclude the proof, 
Q, E.D. 
Propositions 2-4 show that no pooling is the unique symmetric 
equilibrium which always dominates full information pooling. Our 
results are solved for an oligopoly with n firms, and hence the 
asymptotic properties of the equilibrium can be examined when the 
market becomes large, For example, in the continuous game, it is easy 
anil 
to see by equation (4.2 2 )  -8-1 � o as n � m, for any 0 .{ � .{ t.�i 1 � 
That is, any amount of communication among firms is consistent with an 
equilibrium as long as the market is sufficiently large, On the other 
anil 
hand, letting t go to infinity, we also have -,,-1 � O for any "�i 1 � 
n � 2 ,  O .{ � .{ t. To summarize the two limiting effects, denote 
= nt the total amount of information ex ante and y = 
realization ex post. Then the equilibrium output of 
• f • n [ ( n + 1 ) TY ] Q = :l=
t
qi = (n + 1 )b a+ ((n + 1 )T + 2 Rn) ' 
1 n nk Yi the =1 
the industry 
by T 
is 
Consider a situation in which the pooling strategies are adopted, The 
total output then is a trivial standard oligopoly solution, i. e. 
Proposition �. o• - Q converges to zero almost surely as T � m, 
Proof: Simply notice that as T � m, the difference 
o• _ Q = _ n(n - 1 )TR (n + 1 )(T + R)((n + 1 )T + 2 Rn) y 
converges to zero almost surely for n l 2 .
2 1  
Q,E.D. 
• 
Since demand is linear, convergence of Q to Q implies the convergence 
of the equilibrium price (with privately held information) to the 
price in the pooled information situation. Consequently, the ex ante 
expectations such as profits and total social welfare also converge 
correspondingly in the normal sense. Therefore, in an industry with a 
sufficient amount of information, the oligopolists behave as if the 
information is pooled. The competitive price will certainly be 
efficient when the number of firms becomes large, 
We conclude the paper with some more remarks. First, we show 
that there are no asymmetric equilibria only tor the case in which 
partial revelation of the information is not allowed, But the class or 
symmetric equilibria is natural to examine first since firms are 
assumed to have access to equally accurate information. How ever our 
analysis has provided a basis (the explicitly calculated payoffs) for 
the investigation of the asymmetric equilibria in a symmetric 
information setting (our conjecture is that no pooling is the only 
2 2  
equilibrium there) and the equilibrium behavior under asymmetric 
information structure as well. Secondly, in proposition 4, we assume 
the strategies which firms employ are continuous in the first- stage 
game. In many cases such as when �i are scaled sample sizes, it is 
not true. But the equilibrium characterization is still a good 
approximation when the strategy space is discrete. Finally, the 
resUlts in this paper provide a support of Li, HcKelvey and Page 
[1 985] where we investigate the equilibrium behavior of a Cournot 
oligopoly with endogenous information acquisition under the assumption 
that firms will hold the information privately after the acquisition. 
A unique symmetric equilibrium is found there. What we show here is 
that this equilibrium is sustainable because any sharing agreement is 
not an equilibrium. 
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APPENDIX A 
Solution to the system of equations (3.1 1 )- (3.1 4), 
Equation (3.S) is easy to solve. Now rewrite (3.1 4) to be 
(A1 ) 
and then 
(A 2) 
Substituting (A 2) into the right side of (A1 ) and collecting the
terms, we have 
(A3 ) 
By (3,13) , 
for i 'I j. (A4) 
Using (A3) and (A4), we can derive from (3.1 2) that 
2 4  
, J "' i. (AS) 
Summing both sides of (AS) over i (i /. j) and using (3, 1 3) again, we 
get 
, or 
(A6) 
It directly follow s from (AS) and (A6) that 
, i "' J, (A7) 
Q, E,D. 
Letting 'tj = O, j /. i, we have 
i n.....±...1( B2 = h 2 'ti + t + 2 R), i 
APPENDIX B 
a Bi 
�8 1 = ..z_(n - 1 )(t + 2 R)[(n + 2 )t + 2 RJ, 
'ti h2 i 
8Bi 
�8 2 = .n......±-..!.
2 <n 
- t)t(t + 2 R),
'ti h i 
where 
hi = [n + 3)t + 4R]'ti + [(n + 1 )t + 2 R](t + 2 R). 
Note that 
Bi - Bi= - h
t (n - 1 )(t + 2 R) < O, for n 1 2 ,1 2 i 
and equation (4.1 6), It follows 
2 S  
(Bl) 
(B2) 
(B3) 
(B4) 
(BS) 
(B6) 
2 6  
= - 2 R(n - l)(n + l)(t - �i)(t + 2 R)(2�i + t + 2 R).
[(n + 3)t + 4Rl 
h3 i 
i O, for 0 � �i i t and n l 2 . (B7 ) 
Q. E. D. 
2 7  
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